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This work proposes a simple two-period interaction model to study 
EU-Turkey accession negotiations. Turkey perceives the EU as com-
posed of two distinct groups with respect to its accession: tradition-
al supporters and objectors. Supporters opt for either cooperation or 
defection in period one while objectors consistently oppose Turkish 
accession. Turkey reacts to cooperation and defection in the second 
period under its perceptions of EU support. Future uncertainties con-
cerning Turkey’s accession do not prevent supporters’ cooperation 
provided that Turkey becomes successful in economics, political re-
forms, and foreign policy. Turkey continues to negotiate not because 
it appreciates supporters’ cooperation but because no supporter de-
fects. Supporters become concerned about the future interacting with 
a failing Turkey. Unlike impatient supporters that are less concerned 
about the future, patient supporters oppose a failing Turkey’s acces-
sion. Turkey then extremely appreciates supporters’ cooperation but 
quits accession process that becomes highly costly.
Keywords: Supporters, objectors, cooperation, defection, threshold, fu-
ture discount factor 
Introduction
Turkey is the largest Muslim state to have applied for European Union 
(EU) membership. Geographically located at an intersection between 
the Middle East and Europe, it constitutes a unique case in the possible 
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enlargement of the EU. However, after almost five decades of bargain-
ing and negotiations, Turkey suspects that the EU members do not 
genuinely seek its accession.1 It perceives the EU as divided over its 
membership by receiving support from some EU members and observ-
ing Franco-German proposals of privileged partnership (PP) instead of 
membership.2 
A better understanding of Turkish accession to the EU helps us think 
about how intermingling cultural-religious differences affect interna-
tional interactions. A rejected Turkey could cease taking steps toward 
adjustment with European norms and democratisation; a move that 
could socially and politically destabilise the periphery of the EU. Rejec-
tion could even support the “clash of civilizations” thesis and demon-
strate that political-economic blocs can emerge in terms of religious 
and cultural fault lines.3 In that respect, the fate of Turkish accession 
constitutes an outstanding example for world politics.
That said, two recent developments must be taken into account. 
First, Turkish foreign policy recently shifted and has become more in-
dependent in terms of diverting priorities away from Turkey’s tradi-
tional Western orientation and connections. Second, Turkey has eco-
nomically propelled and is now situated among the largest economies 
in the world; a point made more prominent as financial difficulties 
continue to threaten Europe’s common currency and pose formidable 
problems for some members such as Greece. These developments cer-
tainly affect EU members’ incentives in supporting Turkey.
This work argues that, in an interactive context, Turkish success in 
three domains, namely: economics, democratic reforms, and foreign 
policy, play a major role in the level of support Turkey receives from 
the EU. I argue that Turkish successes prevent the impact of future 
concerns on cooperative policies of traditional supporters of Turkey. 
However, a successful Turkey becomes bolder in negotiations unlike 
a failed one. Turkish failures trigger EU concerns about the future of 
Turkey’s accession process and defections in turn. Turkish tendency 
to quit negotiations then increases. Thus, the blend of European and 
Turkish incentives to cooperate and defect paints complex interac-
tions under Turkish successes and failures.
The next section describes European and Turkish perceptions. The 
second outlines assumptions on preferences and interactions. The 
third briefly discusses how Turkish successes and failures in econom-




ences for cooperation and defection. The fourth offers three alterna-
tive interaction paths for the future. The last section concludes this 
work while the appendix contains two basic deductions with respect 
to EU and Turkish actions.
Mutual Perceptions
Turkey’s culture, large, predominantly Muslim population, its his-
tory of interactions with European countries – going back centuries 
– and its geographic location generate EU perceptions of Turkey as 
a non-European country and produces hostile European beliefs and 
discourses with respect to Turkey’s candidacy. The overwhelming ma-
jority of Europeans believe that Christian Europe must be protected 
from Muslim Turks and that Turkey represents an identity that largely 
differs from theirs.4 Therefore, there exist multiple cognitive and dis-
cursive factors working against Turkish accession.
The evidence of adverse European perceptions is abundant. The 
French rejected the draft EU constitution in a 2005 referendum be-
cause they feared the new constitution would make Turkish acces-
sion a likely prospect. French leaders like Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and 
Nicolas Sarkozy, German Prime Minister Angela Merkel, and Dutch 
Leader Geert Wilders argue that Turkey should never have a chance to 
become an EU member. In addition, EU governments cannot discard 
citizens’ opinions easily.5 As a result, Turkish accession faces formida-
ble public and political opposition.
Turkish leaders, in turn, believe that their country is segregated in 
terms of religious and cultural differences. Recent polls conducted in 
Turkey exposed Turks’ beliefs of the European use of double stand-
ards with respect to their country’s membership. Turkish citizens do 
not believe their country will become an EU member.6 The length of 
the accession process, the EU enlargement spanning the accessions of 
the Republic of Cyprus, Central and Eastern European applicants, and 
proposals of PP produce Turkish distrust and suspicion.7 Moreover, 
Turkish leaders and citizens suspect that the EU negotiates to create a 
neighbour sharing European norms but not to integrate it. The ration-
ale is that Turkey, having improved conditions in human rights, civ-
il-military relations and minority rights, is preferable to Turkey having 
not accomplished reforms in these areas.8 
Turkey began its interaction with the EU – the European Economic 
Community at that time – in 1959 with the aim to join the organi-
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sation. It became an associate member by the Ankara Treaty of 1963. 
Turkey, the only candidate country that signed a customs union agree-
ment with the EU, still strives to become an EU member. The length of 
the process is staggering; it covers both Cold War and post-Cold War 
periods, and Turks’ patience is wearing thin. The more the accession 
drags, the more Turks believe that the EU is politically hypocritical. 
Turkish enthusiasm for EU membership accordingly wanes.9
The recent EU enlargement strengthens Turkish perceptions of 
European double standards and non-existence of scales in measuring 
a candidate’s performance to become a member. The acceptance of a 
new member is rooted not in the fulfilment of Copenhagen criteria but 
in EU members’ power, that is, EU members’ interests and ability to in-
fluence the accession process. Indeed, there exists no precise measure 
to quantify the ripeness of economic and political conditions prevail-
ing in the candidate country. To illustrate, Greece became a member in 
1981 while it was negatively evaluated in 1976. In contrast with Turkey, 
some former Communist Bloc countries became members less than 
two decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Hungary and 
Poland became EU members in 2004; Bulgaria and Romania waited 
just three more years for full accession. In short, the fulfilment of the 
Copenhagen criteria is not a sufficient, but a necessary, condition for 
accession.10
Turkish misperceptions about the EU became deeper with the ac-
cession of the Republic of Cyprus in 2004.11 The island has been di-
vided since 1974 and constitutes one of the oldest unresolved inter-
national conflicts. When the UN formulated the Annan Plan to unify 
the island, unlike Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots voted against it. 
Yet Greek Cypriots became EU citizens just a week later. There is a 
claim that the customs union agreement between Turkey and the EU 
was made possible by a promise from the EU to Greece about starting 
accession negotiations with Cyprus; otherwise Greece would have ve-
toed the agreement.12 Hence, the admission of the Republic of Cyprus 
as an EU member exemplifies the Greek veto as an extortionate threat 
first formulated by Thomas C. Schelling.13
Presently, one of the most substantial obstacles to Turkish accession 
remains Turkey’s non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, and, as a 
consequence, Turkey’s denial of its ports to Cypriot trade.14 Cyprus is 
responsible for many frozen chapters in accession negotiations; only 




both declared their support for Turkey in its EU membership quest. 
Yet they also stepped-up their own conditions for a successful pro-
cess: Turkey’s diplomatic recognition of the Cyprus Republic, Turkish 
acceptance of Greek Cypriot trade at its ports and the withdrawal of 
Turkish troops from Cyprus. Unfortunately, no Turkish government 
can fulfil these conditions unless significant Greek and Cypriot con-
cessions and incentives are provided.
Franco-German proposals of PP exacerbate Turkish beliefs further. 
No other candidate – besides Turkey – faced the PP proposal formu-
lated by German Christian democrats in 2002. The proposal was then 
supported not only by Austria, Germany, and France but also by the 
Czech Republic and Denmark.16 Interestingly, even the proponents of 
the proposal do not agree about its content.17 Turkey, as a “privileged 
partner” would have no rights to be part of EU decision-making pro-
cesses; it would only have an observer status Turkey already occupies. 
Hence, the implications of the PP proposal are not clear enough.
Moreover, there is uncertainty about whether Turkey can join the 
EU in the foreseeable future. The Turkish accession process is open 
ended. Turkey might still not achieve its full membership goal even if 
it successfully conducts all reforms needed to fulfil the Copenhagen 
criteria.
Turkey did not abandon its desire to become an EU member. The 
Justice and Development Party (known under AKP, its Turkish acro-
nym), in power since 2002, is of a moderately Islamic political ten-
dency. One might expect that such a party would oppose Turkey’s EU 
membership. However, the AKP continued to spend efforts for the ac-
cession, perhaps because an EU membership can strengthen religious 
actors through higher democratic norms and wider freedom.18 In fact, 
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan rejects PP status and 
affirms that Turkey continues to negotiate with the final goal of be-
coming an EU member. Turkey will not be encrusted in the Western 
world without an EU membership indeed.19 Thus, Turkish preference 
to finalise its European status has strong bases. 
Interactions
Turkey perceives the EU as roughly composed of two groups with re-
spect to its membership bid. Some EU members such as the UK, Swe-
den, Italy, and Spain encourage and cooperate with Turkey by issuing 
declarations of strong support while they recognise the existence of 
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multiple obstacles. They indicate that Turkish membership is not a 
sure prospect; negotiations are open-ended and will take a long time. 
These countries are qualified as supporters and their behaviour as co-
operation. Some EU members such as France and Germany firmly op-
pose Turkey’s accession by openly declaring that Turkey has no place in 
Europe and that Turkey should instead accept a position of privileged 
partner. These countries are qualified as objectors and their behaviour 
as defection in turn.
This work simplifies EU-Turkey accession negotiations as if it con-
sists of two periods. In the first period, supporters and objectors move 
by choosing between defection and cooperation. Turkey moves in the 
second period under its perceptions of a divided EU. Turkey reacts to 
cooperation by continuing negotiations but withdraws given defec-
tion. How would supporters, objectors, and Turkey interact under 
these rules? An answer comes through the distinction between present 
and future payoffs.
Future payoffs represent lesser values compared to present ones, as 
an uncertain future weighs less than the present.20 A discount factor 
represents future evaluations of payoffs. The factor ranges between 
zero and one and scales second-period payoffs down. If the factor is 
close to one, its multiplication produces a second-period payoff which 
is almost equal to the present one. As a consequence, the future be-
comes nearly as valuable as the present. If it is close to zero, second-pe-
riod payoffs become smaller; future does not matter to a high extent. 
To summarise, lower discount factors that are close to zero mean that 
the future is relatively unimportant while higher factors that are close 
to one imply that the future is important and cast a shadow upon pres-
ent interactions.
Germany and France do not act like supporters.21 They always defect 
in the first period. Turkey quits in the second period as a reaction to 
defection. Thus, objectors gain the present value of defection and the 
future value of Turkish exit from the process. If supporters cooper-
ate in the first period, Turkey does not quit in the second period and 
continues to negotiate. Consequently, supporters obtain present and 
future values of having Turkey in track for EU accession. If they defect, 
they gain the present value of defection and the future value of Turkish 
exit similar to objectors. Would supporters defect or cooperate? The 





Objectors’ preferences are fixed: future evaluations do not trans-
form them. As to supporters, they can be assessed as preferring co-
operation the most. The assumption leads to the strategically trivial 
result of supporters’ constant cooperation. Consequently, the EU con-
sists of two groups such that one cooperates and the other defects. No 
strategic uncertainty can affect EU policy towards Turkey’s accession: 
interactions remain the same all the time, as future evaluations do not 
transform cooperators’ preferences similar to objectors. No room for 
change exists in EU-Turkey interactions.
As an alternative, supporters can be assessed as preferring cooper-
ation over defection unlike objectors and, like objectors, seek Turkish 
exit. In fact, the previous section established that such Turkish percep-
tions are well grounded. Turkey perceives that the EU negotiates not 
to ease its accession but rather to prevent it and that no EU member 
genuinely prefers its accession as a full member. Accordingly, we as-
sume that supporters and objectors all prefer a Turkish decision to quit 
from the negotiation process yet, unlike objectors, supporters prefer 
cooperation over defection.
Supporters cooperate provided that the sum of present and future 
values of having Turkey on track for EU membership exceeds the sum 
of present value of their defection and the future value of Turkish exit; 
they defect otherwise. The comparison of cooperation and defection 
payoffs reveals a critical threshold that explains supporters’ choice. The 
threshold is a ratio of the difference between cooperation and defec-
tion values to the difference between the values of cooperation and the 
Turkish decision to quit the process. If the future discount value ex-
ceeds the threshold, supporters prefer to defect. They cooperate when 
the future discount parameter remains below it.22 Hence, supporters’ 
preferences over actions toward Turkey are not immune from future 
evaluations like those of objectors. Supporters can cooperate or defect 
depending on how they evaluate future interactions. Additionally, they 
can evaluate the future differently, but all discount factors must re-
main below the threshold for them to encourage Turkey in its EU bid.
Supporters can also act like objectors. By assumption, the value of 
cooperation is higher than the value of defection for supporters. Thus, 
supporters suffer a net loss from defection in the first period when they 
defect. They recover from the costs and gain some benefit by obtaining 
the value of their most desired outcome provided that Turkey quits 
accession negotiations in the second period. If Turkey does not quit, 
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defection in the first period becomes costly for supporters who would 
then have no incentive to behave like objectors. Therefore, supporters 
prefer to defect, if Turkey, as a reaction, certainly quits the process of 
accession.
Turkish decisions derive from a simple comparison similar to sup-
porters’ decision. If the sum of Turkish payoffs to EU cooperation and 
defection weighed by Turkish beliefs of receiving support or rejection 
constitutes a loss, Turkey stops negotiations. The comparison gener-
ates a threshold in the form of a ratio of Turkish payoff to EU rejec-
tion to the difference between Turkish payoff to EU rejection and EU 
support.23 If the Turkish belief of receiving support remains below the 
threshold, Turkey quits from the accession process.
Empirical Assesments
The Copenhagen criteria emphasises economic and political success-
es – such as achieving a functioning market economy, the capacity to 
compete within the EU, increases in the standards of democracy, and 
human rights – for would-be members. Therefore, Turkey’s success-
es and failures in meeting the criteria affect how supporters evaluate 
cooperation, defection, and the Turkish decision to abandon the pro-
cess.24 It can be safely assumed that objectors are indifferent to Turkish 
successes; Turkish failures can only strengthen their position towards 
Turkey. An analysis indeed claims that the accession of Muslim Turkey 
still remains controversial even if economic barriers are worked out.25 
Cultural differences, which are not included in the Copenhagen crite-
ria, offset repercussions of Turkey’s economic successes. 
Turkey remains almost unaffected by the 2007 global crisis and its 
economic performance is impressive given the financial crises some 
EU members face. In fact, Turkey’s economy is ranked 6th in the world 
in terms of the 2010 single-digit inflation rates compared to those EU 
countries.26 Turkey is the ‘rising power on the Bosporus’ and consti-
tutes an economic power and a “trading state.”27 According to Turkish 
Prime Minister Erdoğan, these facts rule out the possibility of a poor 
country aiming at an expected economic growth through EU mem-
bership.28 
A wealthier Turkey is certainly a more valuable candidate than an 
economically weak one. Supporters would then attribute higher val-
ues to cooperation. The Turkish elite also expects that the long-term 




‘more attractive to Europe.’29 Nevertheless, Turkey’s economy is not 
immune from adverse developments. The Wall Street Journal indicates 
that Turkey’s economic boom is not without structural weaknesses, 
as the value of Turkish lira continues to drop against the US dollar.30 
Therefore, Turkey’s economic performance can vary affecting support-
ers’ evaluations and their critical thresholds to cooperate.
Turkish successes and failures in domestic reforms that aim at im-
proving minority group rights and eliminating military interference 
into domestic politics also affects supporters’ preference for cooper-
ation. Van Rompuy and Barroso, respectively presidents of the Euro-
pean Council and the European Commission, congratulated Erdoğan 
on the success of the AKP in the parliamentary elections of 12 June 
2011. They declared that progress in political reforms ‘should also give 
a new impetus to the accession negotiations with the EU.’31 The ration-
ale is that there is a lesser value in raising objections against a country 
sharing EU political norms. Thus, more valuable become efforts for 
uninterrupted accession negotiations with a more democratic Turkey 
having improved human rights. 
Constitutional amendments have been under way since 2001 and 
those following the 2010 Turkish referendum hint at Turkey’s com-
mitment for success along with the political criteria. Yet, there is no 
new Constitution. Moreover, Turkey’s democratisation is difficult to 
achieve as long as the Kurdish question is not peacefully managed and 
civilian control over the military is not fully established.32 There are 
actually several court cases against alleged military-coup leaders in-
cluding civilians, bureaucrats, and journalists. The cases are still open 
while the intensity of armed clashes between the Turkish Army and 
the PKK (acronym for Partiya Kerkarani Kurdistan) is currently on 
the rise. Elected parliament members of the pro-Kurdish Peace and 
Democracy Party boycotted the Turkish Grand Assembly for a long 
time by refusing to take their parliamentary oaths. Some of them are 
charged with having ties to the PKK and are detained for this reason. A 
new constitution, prepared by the newly elected parliament, might be 
a solution to the Kurdish problem. It is unclear, however, how such a 
collective deal might be found. Political reforms to reach more refined 
norms constitute the greatest impediment to higher cooperation val-
ues and thresholds.
A factor omitted in the Copenhagen criteria – which also impacts 
supporters’ cooperation value – is Turkey’s conduct of it new, more 
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active, foreign policy that aims at ‘zero-conflict’ with its neighbours 
and the establishment of lucrative trade relations. According to Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the architect of the 
new TFP, Turkey constitutes a source of stability for many countries 
and enjoys ‘strategic depth.’33 He believes that Turkey is differentiated 
from other Islamic states with its unique history and Turkish speaking 
minorities around the world. Turkey’s imperial history, geopolitical 
position, cultural affinities and ties can help foreign-policy makers in 
the Middle East and the Balkans to understand how interconnected 
are their countries with each other and with Turkey. Any Turkish for-
eign policy not tapping into the strategic depth constrains Turkey’s 
diplomatic power and leverage. 
Some analysts qualify the new TFP as “soft Euro-Asianism” as ac-
cession to the EU no more occupies an utmost priority for Turkish 
decision makers who are busy in building commercial and political 
connections with China and Russia.34 On the contrary, some analysts 
indicate that Turkish commitment to joining the EU is still strong. Ac-
cording to a political analyst, Turkey simply has alternative foreign op-
tions to increase its wealth and political influence at regional and glob-
al levels; the EU bid is just one of them. The new TFP remains in line 
with AKP political elite’s cultural background and exhibits a “trading 
state” behaviour evolving through commercial links.35 We also claim 
that a powerful and prosperous Turkey would become an attractive EU 
candidate through management of energy routes from Central Asia to 
Europe, Russo-Turkish energy cooperation prospects, lucrative trade 
interactions at different scales, and resolution of old animosities and 
conflicts in the neighbourhood. 
Nevertheless, there are some question marks about the new TFP 
that became more volatile and independent in terms of the country’s 
traditional-Western orientation. Some analysts believe that the drift in 
TFP constitutes a reaction to EU and American policies.36 Consequent-
ly, there exists a tension between Turkish efforts for accession and the 
new TFP orientation.37 The accession of Turkey would lead to the EU 
entanglement in centuries-old rivalries ravaging the Middle East and 
the Caucasus.38 The current deterioration of Turkey-Israel and Tur-
key-Syria relations can indeed revive such worries and demonstrate 
that the new TFP can spectacularly fail. However, provided that the 
new TFP succeeds, Turkey’s accession would not necessarily entail the 




TFP can strengthen or undermine anti-Turkish geo-strategic assess-
ments within the EU and affect supporters’ incentives to cooperate.
Paths of Interactions
A complex system of incentives underlies EU-Turkey interactions. The 
value of cooperation increases for supporters as Turkey registers suc-
cesses in economics, foreign policy, and domestic reforms. The conse-
quence becomes higher cooperation thresholds for supporters. It then 
becomes more likely that supporters’ future discounts remain below 
thresholds which are getting closer to the value of one. Therefore, 
supporters cooperate with a successful Turkey by becoming less con-
cerned about the future. 
Yet, Turkish successes have produced an inversed impact on the 
Turkish threshold to quit. A successful Turkey can be assumed to 
evaluate objectors’ defections as representing lesser costs. The conse-
quence becomes lower Turkish thresholds to quit negotiations. It then 
becomes more likely that the now reduced Turkish beliefs of receiving 
support remains below thresholds which are contracting even more. 
Therefore, the slightest Turkish belief of receiving considerably low 
support, and, therefore, Turkish suspicion that supporters’ now act 
like objectors, can prompt Turkey to end its EU membership quest.
In contrast, Turkish failures generate lower values of cooperation 
for supporters. The threshold of supporters’ cooperation then be-
comes smaller. If supporters’ future discounts are high and close to 
the value of one, it is likely that they exceed smaller thresholds. As a 
consequence, supporters who are patient, so that the future matters 
for them, prefer defect and act like objectors. Otherwise, if supporters 
do not care much about the future and, therefore, their discount fac-
tors are small and close to zero, then they cooperate. Therefore, those 
supporters that are less concerned about the future cooperate with 
those who care about the future and defect against a failing Turkey in 
accession negotiations.
For Turkey, the higher the rate of its failures, the higher are the costs 
of an EU rejection. A failing Turkey suffers more in the process and 
Turkey’s threshold for ending negotiations rises. As a result, it becomes 
more likely that high Turkish belief of receiving support remains short 
of higher thresholds. Therefore, a failing Turkey can give up its EU 
membership bid even if its belief of receiving support is relatively 
strong. Three alternative paths below organise these dynamics and 
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display the complexity of EU-Turkey interactions. 
Full Success
As established, supporters continue to cooperate if their future dis-
count rate remains below the critical threshold. In general, Turkish 
successes along the three dimensions lead to higher values of coop-
eration and lower values of Turkish unilateral exit and defection. The 
threshold then swiftly increases so that no discount rate can exceed it. 
Time preferences become obsolete for supporters.
Naturally, it is impossible to assess that each supporter has the same 
future preference as the others; some might be more patient, others 
less. If the threshold is high enough, it is more likely that each indi-
vidual future discount rate remains below it, triggering cooperation. 
Consequently, supporters’ time preferences would not matter for their 
cooperative conduct as long as the new TFP continues to augment 
Turkish power and reputation, domestic reforms are conducted at 
a steady rate, and Turkish economy continues to thrive. Supporters 
would always cooperate with a successful Turkey regardless its evalu-
ations of future. 
A fully successful Turkey remains in track not because it highly val-
ues supporters’ cooperation but because it faces no objection. Turkey, 
registering successes in all three domains, does not have to perceive 
that the EU is the only way to harness wealth and power. It would end 
accession negotiations at the slightest perception of defection emanat-
ing from supporters. Yet no defection occurs in this case. Therefore, 
a fully successful Turkey does not need a high level of cooperation to 
continue accession negotiations. It can spend efforts to become an EU 
member under even smaller beliefs of receiving support. 
Mixed Success
If Turkey fails in some domain, supporters’ payoff to cooperation de-
creases while Turkish unilateral exit and defection become more at-
tractive for supporters. The weight of failures on the threshold can 
vary and affect each other. For example, failures in domestic reform 
can be evaluated as inconsiderable next to Turkish economic success-
es. An economic setback would hurt domestic reform efforts. Reversals 
in new TFP would drain economic performance and vice versa. As a 
result, the critical threshold would become lower at different rates af-




erences start to matter given Turkish failures, because the discount 
rate must be lower than smaller thresholds for supporters to cooper-
ate. Supporters’ future payoffs then are weighted by discount factors 
close to zero. Thus, if supporters cooperate under some Turkish fail-
ures, say, in the domain of human rights reforms, this implies that the 
future concerns play a relatively lesser role in their preferences toward 
Turkey. 
Supporters do not necessarily have the same evaluations of the fu-
ture. Some can cooperate with a failing Turkey only if the present is 
more important than the future, that is, if they are impatient. Some 
patient supporters can in turn value the future and defect while Turkey 
registers mixed successes. One would intuitively expect that if the fu-
ture matters, some EU countries would have a higher tendency to co-
operate with Turkey. Unfortunately, this might not be the case. Turk-
ish failures induce supporters to encourage Turkey only if supporters 
evaluate future gains of the accession process are not as valuable as the 
present ones. The future then casts a shadow over present EU-Turkey 
interactions.
An economic or a foreign policy success can induce Turkish lead-
ers to become bolder during the accession process even if they fail in 
achieving higher standards of democracy and human rights. The rea-
son is simple; leaders can assess EU defective moves as less costly com-
pared to periods with no Turkish accomplishments in economics or 
foreign policy. A successful Turkey would evaluate EU cooperation as 
representing lesser values and become highly sensitive to a support-
er’s defection. Therefore, as EU cooperation loses value in the eyes of 
Turkish leaders, stopping negotiations can become a compelling op-
tion.
According to Turkish leaders, Turkey having a stronger economy or 
an increased influence and power through its new foreign policy might 
not need an EU membership. Political reforms, for example, are not 
necessarily conducted to meet EU criteria; they are tools to improve 
Turkish standards of living. It is also possible that Turks simply will 
not desire their country to become an EU member in the future. Na-
tional priorities can change. Perhaps EU membership is no more the 
principal Turkish national interest.39 Recent speeches emanating from 
the highest-rank Turkish leaders indicate that a reversal in Turkish 
preference might actually occur in the long run. Hence, a defection 
by a traditional supporter could prompt a partially successful Turkey 
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to stop negotiations as Turkish perceptions of receiving support falls 
below the threshold. 
To sum up, if Turkey is economically successful facing setbacks in 
foreign-policy or internal reforms, the accession process can become 
more conflictive than before. It is possible that some supporters defect 
and Turkey evaluates EU support as representing a lesser weight. The 
path of interactions can then reflect mixed actions and reactions both 
from the EU and Turkey demonstrating how cultural and religious dif-
ferences divide states.
Full Failure
If Turkey fails in all three domains, the threshold for supporters’ co-
operation decreases further. All discount rates can exceed it trigger-
ing full EU opposition against Turkey. Turkish beliefs then determine 
Turkish decision to quit accession negotiations. To illustrate this, im-
agine that the EU decides to suspend accession negotiations as Turkey 
does not open its ports to Greek Cypriot vessels. Turkey must quit as a 
reaction because supporters suffer a net loss from defection in the first 
period when they defect. Supporters recover from the cost and make 
some benefit if Turkey quits accession negotiations in the second peri-
od obtaining the value of their most desired outcome. 
Turkey quits if the expectation of continuing negotiations consti-
tutes a loss given an overall EU defection. Turkey indeed suffers from 
an EU defection to a high extent because the EU becomes the sole 
anchor given no success in any domain. The higher the costs Turkey 
suffers from the EU defection, the higher the threshold for Turkish 
perceptions of interacting with supporters. Thus, while cooperation 
becomes highly valuable for a failed Turkey, it quits believing that even 
its traditional supporters tend to oppose its accession. In other words, 
a totally failed Turkey quits the accession process because negotiations 
becomes highly costly while it extremely appreciates supporters’ coop-
eration. Hence, the third scenario demonstrates how a Muslim coun-
try can be a member of NATO but not of the EU. 
Conclusion
This work obtained insights about EU-Turkey membership negotia-
tions through a fairly simple analysis. The analysis developed does not 
aim at an empirical application, an overly complicated objective. The 




the future will look like. They generate conceptual clarifications and 
insights by letting us think about different scenarios. Despite its sim-
plicity, the analysis reveals how Turkish beliefs and EU time preferenc-
es change in function of Turkish successes and failures. In gist, Tur-
key would reciprocate cooperative moves as long as there is a division 
within the EU regarding Turkey’s accession. As to future concerns of 
Turkey’s traditional supporters, they outline possible paths depending 
on how Turkey fares.
The present analysis can be extended to cover additional periods, 
actions, and EU groups towards Turkish membership to allow for 
more complexity. Nevertheless, it sheds some light on the present and 
the future EU-Turkey negotiations. Any analysis of EU-Turkey inter-
actions must be dynamic, as actors must look forward about succes-
sive periods and they can hurt each other in the future affecting their 
choices today. If Turkey is successful, the accession process will linger 
on for more years to come. This might be interpreted as a failure by 
some and as a success by others who oppose the adhesion of a Muslim 
country in the EU.
Appendix 
Supporters’ threshold for cooperation and defection
Let A1 denote the value of Turkish unilateral end of negotiations, A2 
the value of cooperation with Turkey, and A3 the value of defection, 
that is, the opposition against full Turkish membership, for support-
ers. Supporters’ preference ordering is assumed to be A1 > A2 > A3 > 0. 
Supporters’ cooperation payoff becomes A2 + δA2 as it obtains A2 in both 
periods, but the second-period payoff is discounted. If supporters de-
fect, they obtain A3 in the first period. Turkey then suffers B2 in the first 
period, updates its beliefs, and presumes it is dealing with objectors. 
As a result, Turkey stops negotiations in the second period. Turkish 
exit move generates a payoff of A1 for supporters. Thus, the support-
ers receive a payoff of A3 + δ A1 from defection. They cooperate only if 
cooperation yields a higher payoff than defection, that is, if A3 + δ A1 < 
A2 + δ A2. Rearranging, we obtain δ A1 − δ A2 < A2 − A3.  Hence, we have 
δ (A1 − A2) < A2 − A3. Dividing both sides of the inequality by A1 − A2, 











Turkish threshold for continuing negotiations
Turkey walks away only if ending negotiations generates a payoff 
greater than or equal to the uncertain prospect negotiating with sup-
porters or objectors. Turkey must decide to stay in or to exit the nego-
tiation process without knowing whether it interacts with supporters 
or objectors. Turkish expectation of continuing negotiations is pB1 + (1 
- p)B2 where  p and 1 - p  are Turkish beliefs of interacting with support-
ers and objectors; B1 and B2 are Turkish payoffs to EU cooperation and 
defection, respectively. We assume that B1 > 0 > B2. If the expectation 
constitutes a loss, that is, 0 > pB1 + (1 - p)B2, Turkey stops to avoid any 
more losses. The inequality implies that:
The threshold  is positive, as both the nominator and the 
denominator of threshold are negative and smaller than one under the 
assumption of B1 > 0 > B2.
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